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INTRODUCTION
This International Economic Law Conference has charged itself
with a rather lofty task -- that of analyzing the professed justifica-
tions of the prevailing neoliberal path of globalization by asking the
following question: "Will the new world economic order we de-
scribe lead to greater peace, stability, fairness and justice'?"' The
global monetary system constitutes perhaps the most important legal
and institutional foundation of today's world economic order in an-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. Thanks
to Stephen Zamora, Cynthia Lichtenstein, and Chantal Thomas for comments dur-
ing a panel discussion that helped to inform this paper. I also appreciate the en-
couragement of Jeff Dunoff, Sara Ford, and Jeff Atik, and I am indebted to Bill
McLeod, Linda Longmire, Irwin Stotzky, Barbara Creel, Marty Melkonian, Bill
Krehm, Noam Chomsky, Linda McQuaig, Ray Canterbery, and Jenny Moore for
providing me with insight and inspiration. Thanks also to Dean Robert Desiderio
for his steadfast support and a summer research grant to complete this article. This
essay is dedicated to the men and women who implemented the 1944 Bretton
Woods Agreement through legislation and convention, and the generation that
found the vision and discipline to enforce it for nearly three decades.
1. See hIteifaces: From International Trade to International Economic Law,
ANNuAL CONFERENCE, (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Int'l Econ. Law Group, Wash-
ington, D.C.), (Feb. 18-20, 2000).
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swering such fundamental questions of peace, stability, and justice.
By analyzing the most significant changes in international monetary
law, we can shed a great deal of light on how the new world eco-
nomic order fails to deliver on its promise of peace, justice, and the
so-called American way to prosperity.
Part I of this article will analyze how the global monetary system
has been transformed over the past two generations from one with a
fairly significant degree of regulation and controls on short-term
capital flows to a highly liberalized financial environment. The pre-
vailing orthodoxy of liberalized finance, which rests on particularly
flawed narratives and discourses, results in recurrent monetary disor-
ders -- balance of payments crises that necessitate some kind of ad-
justment of monetary imbalances. Unfortunately, the traditional,
dominant model for adjustment places the entire burden of' adjust-
ment on countries experiencing balance of payment deficits. Such
asymmetrical adjustment burdens provide a powerful indictment of'
the new world economic order's failures.2 Free portfolio capital
flows have also provided an undemocratic check on once-sovereign
nation-states to pursue progressive social and economic policies.'
Part II of this article analyzes the relationship between neoliberal
discourse and central bank autonomy, another institutional pillar of
the new world economic order that rests on questionable assump-
tions, dubious legal foundations, and flawed historical narratives that
constrain discussion of alternative models. Once again, the material
conditions resulting from such structures of thought and policy are at
odds with the new world order's legitimizing justifications. When
2. See GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: OPEN SOCILTY
ENDANGERED 120-25 (1998).
3. This is neoliberal "can't": once-sovereign governments are told that they
"can't" pursue progressive social and economic policies because of the threats
posed by currency depreciation and capital flight resulting from neo-liberalized Fi-
nance. See discussion infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (enumerating
threats posed by neoliberal "can't").
4. The new world economic order hangs its legitimacy in the triumphalism of'
American-style capitalism, and the assumption that such triumph has resulted in
greater good for the greatest numbers of people in the world. See FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 44-46 (1992); see also
RAY CANTERBERY, WALL STREET CAPITALISM: THE THEORY OF TII
BONDHOLDING CLASS 2-3 (2000) [hereinafter CANTERBERY, WALL STRLEET
CAPITALISM] (explaining that "end of history" refers to presumed permanent
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combined with the dangers posed by financial liberalization and
structural adjustment, central bank autonomy contributes to greater
economic inequalities while raising the specter of recurrent financial
instability.
5
While the new world economic order provides riches for the ruling
elite around the globe, it also generates fear and trepidation among
this elite as well. Their peace is repeatedly shattered by dark omens
of financial instability. After concluding that today's neoliberal state
generates injustice, fear, and insecurity, as opposed to peace and jus-
tice, Part III of this article considers alternative paths of globaliza-
tion.
I. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
DIS/ORDER
International monetary law has undergone two sea changes of pro-
found significance during the past two generations. The first brought
about the discipline and stability of the Bretton Woods System that
provided the bulwark for the reconstruction of a world torn apart by
war-a monetary reconstruction that helped maintain peace during
the cold war by contributing to social, economic, and financial sta-
bility, high levels of employment, and a greater level of social justice
than existed in earlier periods." Bretton Woods helped the advanced
capitalist countries to accomplish these objectives through a dual
strategy that limited reliance on short-term speculative private capital
investment, while providing significant public sector transfers of re-
dominance of United States free-market capitalism and "happy ending" for those
following such model).
5. See CANTERBERY, WALL STREET CAPITALISM, supra note 4, at 3 (noting
that central bank autonomy also results in the domination of monetary policy by
private constituencies of privilege and power that favor price stability over em-
ployment creation and public spending programs): see also discussion infra Part 1I
(describing the autonomy of central banks and lack of transparency in the neolib-
eral state).
6. See Victor L. Urquidi, Reconstruction vs. Development: The AIF and the
World Bank, in THE BRETrON WOODs-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 48 (1996) (noting that the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment was negotiated during the concluding months of World War II to provide a
multilateral legal framework for international monetary payments and currency
stability).
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sources to spur economic development.7
The Bretton Woods System was eventually undermined by its own
legal and policy limitations, institutional constraints, and a political
culture that led increasingly to the capture of central banking by fi-
nancial interests seeking liberalization from the system's legal and
regulatory restraints." Captured regulators often ratified widespread
evasion of regulatory controls, thereby undermining exchange rate
stability under the guise of marketplace financial innovation." Mean-
while the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the primary multi-
lateral institution created by Bretton Woods, further undermined the
system of fixed exchange rates by placing the entire burden of ad-
justment on deficit countries.' ° During a period in which countries
7. See Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads
of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1610 (1999) [herein-
after Canova, Neoliberal Contagion] (discussing Article VI of Bretton Woods,
which provides member countries with an important policy tool, namely the right
to impose restrictions on capital flows).
8. Political scientists have long recognized that the political culture of interest
group pluralism invites agency capture through overly broad delegations of legis-
lative power to administrative agencies that exercise wide discretion. See
THEODORE LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 22, 50-51(1979); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132-33 (1980) (criticizing overly-broad
delegations to semi-autonomous administrative agencies). See also Enrico Colom-
batt & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Co-
operation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 933
(1996) (offering a public choice argument that regulators engage in private wealth-
maximizing behavior). Agency capture contributed to the liberalization of foreign
exchange and capital markets, as well as the preference for high real interest rates
as the exclusive policy to maintain domestic price stability and foreign exchange
stability. See infra notes 9, 71-72, and accompanying text.
9. See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance:
From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV.
1295, 1304-06 (1995) [hereinafter Canova, Free-Market Receivership] (describing
agency ratification of marketplace evasions of regulatory controls).
10. The IMF long ago accepted a highly asymmetrical approach to adjustment,
for instance, by adopting a restrictive interpretation of the so-called "scarce cur-
rency" clause. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec.
27, 1945, Art. VII, §3(b), 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter Articles of Agreement] (pro-
viding the multilateral treaty commitments regarding fixed exchange rates between
member countries). See also Frances Stewart, Back to Keynesianism: Reforming
the IMF, 4 WORLD POL'Y J. 465, 472 (1987) (discussing the aggregate effects of
IMF activities). Stewart notes that the United States trade deficit is linked to de-
creased demand in Third World countries and that "IMF-mandated cutbacks in
1282 [15:1279
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became increasingly dependent on the fickle finance of short-term
private capital flows, official transfers of public capital began to de-
cline."
The United States dollar was the linchpin of the Bretton Woods
System of fixed exchange rates; however, by the early 1970's, the
United States economy fell into balance-of-payment deficit while
foreign holders of dollars increasingly demanded convertibility of the
dollar into gold. 2 The Nixon administration had few choices at the
time. It could have swallowed the IMF's model for adjustment for
deficit countries - namely, fiscal and monetary austerity - but with
global commitments to contain the real and imagined spread of So-
viet Communism, the IMF's model was not an appealing option.
Nixon refused to deflate those commitments and instead ended the
dollar's convertibility to gold.'" The Bretton Woods System had ef-
fectively passed into history.'
4
What has replaced the Bretton Woods System? The most recent
sea change in the global financial architecture and international
monetary law has been the development of today's neoliberal mone-
tary order. It is well-documented how neoliberal policy reforms re-
sulted in an explosion of cross-border private capital flows (to well
over one trillion dollars a day); particularly short-term portfolio in-
Third World spending and employment" led to decreases in worldwide demand
and output. Id. See also Roy Harrod, THE DOLLAR: SIR GEORGE WATSON
LECTURES 1953, 110 (1954) (criticizing the limited bilateral nature of the scarce
currency clause). Harrod argues that the words of Art. VII, §3(b) -violate the mul-
tilateral principle" that is supposed to lay the foundation of the IMF. I.
11. See Kenneth Kasa, The Composition of International Capital Flows, 2000-
18 FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECON. LETrER (June 2, 2000) (re-
porting that public capital transfers to developing countries fell from about 50% of
total net flows at beginning of 1990s to about 15% of the total by end of decade).
12. See Benjamin J. Cohen, A Brief Histor" of International MonetarY Rela-
tions, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER
AND WEALTH 234, 249-50 (2d ed. 1991).
13. LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC
THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II 24 (1996) [hereinafter
TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM] (discussing the devaluation of the dollar and
the "closing of the gold window" under Nixon's New Economic Policy).
14. See Cohen, supra note 12 at 253; see also TURGEON, BASTARD
KEYNESIANISM, supra note 13, at 21 (noting that the United States could have
protected the dollar by adopting capital controls and/or cutting its foreign expen-
ditures on the Vietnam War and elsewhere).
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vestment flows (i.e., highly liquid stocks and bonds) known as "hot
money" because of the speed by which such short-term capital can
move in or out of a country.15
To appreciate how central the program of capital account liberali-
zation is to the development of the new global economic order, one
need only consider the many bilateral and multilateral efforts to en-
trench such liberalization with the force of law.'6 The combination of
such efforts undermined the legal rights of countries around the
world to protect themselves against speculative attacks on their cur-
rencies, yet without explicitly amending international monetary law.
For instance, while Article VI of the Bretton Woods Agreement ex-
plicitly provides member nations with the legal authority to impose
controls on capital movements,' 7 in recent years the IMF has actively
undermined such an important policy tool by routinely requiring
capital account liberalization as a condition for financial and struc-
tural adjustment assistance." Also in recent years, the IMF has un-
successfully pushed for amending its charter to provide express ju-
risdiction to push capital account liberalization, an amendment that
would have explicitly killed Article VI. 9 During the worst of the
Asian financial crisis, the IMF stepped back from this agenda, but
only slightly, compromising on the pace, but not the direction of'
15. See David Felix, On Drawing General Policy Lessons From Recent Latin
American Currency Crises, 20 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 191, 198 (1997-98)
(noting that the incongruity between the exponential expansion of international fi-
nancial flows since the "demise" of Bretton Woods stunted global growth of pro-
duction and output). Felix also reports that the global foreign exchange turnover
rose from S 18.5 billion per day in 1977 to $1.23 trillion in 1995. Id.
16. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1614-18 (critiquing ef-
forts to advance capital account liberalization through the State Department's Bi-
lateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") program, and multilateral efforts of World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"), and Bank for International Settlements ("BIS")). See also Noam
Chomsky, Domestic Constituencies, Z MAGAZINE, May 1998, at 16, 24 (reporting
on OECD proposal for Multilateral Agreement on Investments ("MAI") to bar all
national constraints on capital flows).
17. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 10, Art. VI §3 (providing legal
guidelines for member nations in using controls on capital flows).
18. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1613 n. 173-76 (dis-
cussing IMF's loan conditionality requirement of capital account liberalization).
19. See id. at 1612-13 n. 170-71.
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capital account liberalization.2°
In addition, many developing countries have "unilaterally" opened
themselves up to the dangers of sudden outflows of portfolio capital
as a strategy to attract inflows of scarce capital.2 ' This move was un-
doubtedly part of the Mexican leaders' motivation in agreeing to the
investment liberalization provisions of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").2- Such rationale is a product of the
dominant neoliberal narratives and discourses that blame the devel-
oping countries for their lack of access to scarce capital and, thereby,
call for a range of structural adjustment and policy changes in those
countries, including liberalization, privatization, central bank auton-
omy, and austerity.23
Neoliberal discourse is essential to provide justification for the
new world economic order's institutional framework and policy
agenda.24 This discourse claims to be value-neutral and cloaks itself
in the mystique of scientific certainty"-as if economics were a hard
science like physics or chemistry2-a pretense that serves to disem-
power and discredit critics of the neoliberal model. But the terms of
neoliberal discourse are far from value-neutral: rather, they reflect
20. See Timothy A. Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobility and
the Limits of the Orthodox Imagination: A Critique of ROBERT SOotiOMON\. MO\'E)
ON THE MOVE: THE REVOLUTION IN IKTEPATIONAL FIN.4.\CE SI.VcE 1980," 9 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 222 n. 12 (2000) [hereinafter Canova, The Disorders of
Unrestricted Capital Mobility] (describing the IMF's commitment to keeping
capital account liberalization as its highest priority despite growing criticism of its
role in "exacerbating the global currency contagion").
21. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1617 (reporting that
many developing countries liberalize their capital accounts to attract foreign in-
vestment).
22. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
chs. 11, 14, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
23. See generally Canova, Neoliberal Contagion. supra note 7.
24. See Id.
25. See Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobili
. 
supra note
20, at 219 n.l (distinguishing economics from the hard sciences through assertion
that economics deals with uncontrollable conditions and theories that are difficult
to refute).
26. See id. at 219. Compare Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitu-
tional Space: What Lauiyers Can Learn Front Modern Physics. 103 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1989) (employs the use of physics metaphors to illustrate the need for a revised
constitutional jurisprudence).
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the values of private constituencies of power and privilege. 2 For in-
stance, the neoliberal program of capital account liberalization often
rests on narratives of "economic efficiency."28 But such narratives
ignore inconsistent historical and empirical evidence.2" This permits
the alleged inefficiencies of capital restrictions to appear paramount
over other considerations. °
In neoliberal parlance, the definitions of basic terms have dis-
27. See Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobility, supra note
20, at 219, 224-25 (noting that, for instance, privileged constituencies generally
value private investment over public sector economic development efforts).
28. Capital scarcity, like capital accumulation, is a function of market conditions
as well as marketplace power and favorable terms of trade often supported by a
high "degree-of-monopoly." See E. Ray Canterbery, Galbraith, Sraffa, Kalecki and
supra-surplus capitalism, 7 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 77, 83-87 (1984); see also
E. Ray Canterbery and William McLeod, The doctrine of inherent productivity:
Keynes, Sraffa, and Kalecki, 11 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 630, 639 (1989) (noting
that capital accumulation must conform to conditions prevailing when products are
ready for sale). The authors argue that capital "creates and destroys" market proc-
esses, thus precluding the potentially of "inherent productivity." Id.
29. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing the domination of
flawed historical narratives that overshadow alternative narratives based on fact).
30. For instance, while some proponents of free trade with China have con-
ceded the probable need for trade adjustment assistance for American workers dis-
placed by Chinese imports, their priority was to obtain permanent normal trading
relations status for China. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's
WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469 (2000) (stating that trade
adjustment assistance could wait, which in reality means that eventually it will
probably be either denied completely or grossly insufficient).
Likewise, the free capital mobility usually trumps the classical liberal concern
for the free movement of people. In the new world economic order, while capital
moves across borders in a nano-second, ordinary people risk their lives to cross
borders. See Alan Riding, In Searing Images, Ravages of Upheaval: Brazilian
Chronicles the Toll of Migration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2000, at BI (describing
past decade as time of greatest migration of people in modem times); see also
Warren Hoge, Bodies of 58 Asians in Dover: An 'Evil Trade in People.' N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2000, at A3 (reporting on deaths of 58 illegal immigrants from ap-
parent suffocation in back of truck); see also David Gonzalez, 300 People, 14
Dead, Found Stranded on Isle in Bahamas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at A6 (re-
porting on suffering and deaths of Haitian "boat people" en route to the United
States); see also 13 of 17 Stuffed in Van Killed in Crash With Truck, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 5, 1999, §1 at C16 (reporting on deaths of 13 illegal Mexican migrants); see
also One Dead, 21 Hurt in Crash, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 22, 2000, at A3 (re-
porting on another fatal crash of van carrying 22 undocumented Mexican immi-
grants).
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tinctly biased meanings." "Adjustment" always means the policy
concessions that must be made by deficit countries to restore them to
balance.32 This biased definition of adjustment marginalizes the idea
that surplus countries should bear some of the burden of adjustment
by increasing their imports from deficit countries or by requiring
them to actually recycle a portion of their foreign monetary reserves
to deficit countries.33
Likewise, in neoliberalese, "foreign investment" has increasingly
come to mean private investment, and usually a particular type of
private investment-that of portfolio capital (i.e., "hot money").,4
Such a meaning minimizes the importance of other forms of private
investment, including longer-term relational investment such as for-
eign direct investment, and completely marginalizes the very idea of
public investment. For instance, neoliberal usage ignores past suc-
cesses of public transfers of capital, such as the Marshall Plan-
known officially as the European Recovery Program-under which
the United States gave $13 billion (more than $150 billion in today's
dollars) in foreign aid from 1947 to 1951 to rebuild the economies of
Western Europe." Since Western Europe used those Marshall Plan
31. See generally infra notes 64, 65, 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing
the biased definitions of "transparency", "accountability", and "autonomy").
32. Many of the dominant neoliberal narratives fail to prescribe the adjustment
medicine to the United States, which has now become the greatest trade deficit
country in world history. See Trade Deficit For March Hit $30.2 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2000, at B2 (reporting that the United States trade deficit grew to a
record high of $30.2 billion due to a growing demand for oil, automobiles and im-
ports). See also Asking the Right Questions About the IMF. 13 THE REGION,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANNUAL REPORT. May 1999. Despite
its title, this IMF report failed to ask any fundamental questions about burdens of
adjustment.
33. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 163642 (arguing that
surplus nations that remain chronically unbalanced need to bear burdens of ad-
justment); Chantal Thomas, Does the "Good Governance Policy" of the Interna-
tional Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the Erpense ol'DenocracY?, 14
CONN. J. INT'L L. 551 (1999).
34. See Kasa, supra note 11.
35. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1638-39 (providing
overview of the Marshall Plan and the United States' contribution of foreign aid to
developing countries). Likewise, Japan recycled surpluses by paying about S1.2
billion in reparations to Southeast Asian countries after the Second World War.
Those payments ended around 1976. See LYNN TURGEON, The Political Economy
of Reparations, NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 111. 122 (Winter 1973) [hereinafter
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funds to purchase United States capital goods, the Marshall Plan
helped to sustain demand in the United States economy as well. "
The biases of neoliberal discourse permit policymakers to position
themselves as pseudo-reformers while silencing critics of orthodox
policy.37 Moreover, biased definitions, such as the neoliberal defini-
tion of foreign investment, distort the public discourse by presenting
a false all-or-nothing dichotomy to developing countries trying to at-
tract capital. In other words, either a country adopts the neoliberal
market reforms necessary to attract private portfolio investment or it
receives no investment at all. The false all-or-nothing dichotomy pre-
sented to developing countries distorts public discussion of other im-
portant trade issues as well. For instance, the elite of developing
countries are naturally hesitant to discuss human rights, labor, and
environmental standards precisely because higher standards will re-
duce their cost advantages and undermine their abilities to attract or
maintain present levels of private investment. But if accords on
higher standards were supplemented by public capital trans-
fers-essentially the Marshall Plan model--then developing country
governments might be more receptive to higher standards, rather than
the race to the bottom alternative. "
TURGEON, NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE] (stating that export surpluses are usually a
sign of weakness in domestic demand and reparations permit the surplus country to
maintain economic growth through exports). After its reparations ended in 1976,
Japan was able to hide its declining productivity for a time by pushing women out
of the labor force and dumping products on world markets. See LYNN TURGEON,
THE ADVANCED CAPITALIST SYSTEM: A REVISIONIST VIEW 42, 81-82 (1980)
[hereinafter TURGEON, THE ADVANCED CAPITALIST SYSTEM] (explaining unem-
ployment rates and inflation).
36. See TURGEON, NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, supra note 35, at 120 (arguing that
the Marshall Plan was employment-creating and neo-mercantilist by allowing the
United States "to extend the sale of its goods on foreign markets without importing
goods from abroad").
37. See Timothy A. Canova, Global Finance and the International Monetar)
Fund's Neoliberal Agenda: The Threat to the Employment, Ethnic Identity. and
Cultural Pluralism of Latina/o Communities, 33 DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1573-74
(2000) [hereinafter Canova, Global Finance] (discussing marginalization of Joseph
Stiglitz, who was presented with the "choice" of silencing himself or resigning as
World Bank chief economist, in retaliation for criticizing IMF's orthodox policies).
38. See Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobilitv; supra note
20, at 230 n.51 (discussing how such issues played out at the WTO's Third Minis-
terial meeting in Seattle in December 1999). Most neoliberals advocated perma-
nent normal trade relations (PNTR) with China and China's entry in the WTO re-
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Neoliberal narratives offer false dichotomies for a wide range of
policy options by sharing the basic mantra that "there is no alterna-
tive."39 This distortion of language is typical of neoliberal "cant"'
and neoliberal "can't."4' The false dichotomies and biased definitions
send the message that the international monetary system "can't"
place adjustment burdens on the so-called winners of the global eco-
nomic competition, even though they are the most capable of bearing
those burdens; that governments of rich countries "can't" find the re-
sources to recycle or transfer public capital to developing countries;
and that we "can't" afford a more equitable economic system that
provides for the neglected both at home and in deficit countries
abroad.42
gardless of their dismal human rights, labor, or environmental standards. See gen-
erally Bhala, supra note 30. Additionally, neoliberals advocated PNTR without
consideration of whether China should be convinced to recycle its huge surplus of
foreign monetary reserves to maintain its high levels of demand and economic
growth, and thereby provide an incentive for higher standards. I
39. See Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobiity, supra note 20,
at 228 n.43 (discussing the origins of the "there is no alternative" ("TINA") man-
tra). But see id., 230 n.52 (arguing that "We have other alternatives" (WHOA!), an
appropriate rejoinder for those who oppose the TINA view).
40. The false dichotomies characteristic of neoliberal discourse fit the diction-
ary definition of "cant": to talk hypocritically; the expression or repetition of con-
ventional, trite, or unconsidered opinions or sentiments: especially the insincere
use of pious phraseology. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 163 (1975).
41. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how false dichotomies
of neoliberal "can't" preclude the international monetary system from placing ad-
justment burdens on surplus countries).
42. Sometimes neoliberal discourse asserts that we "can't" undertake policies
that stimulate the economy because it would be "bad economics." See Alan Park-
man, Comments at the Forum on Globalization, University of New Mexico School
of Law, Apr. 17, 2000 (stating that deficit countries must accept austerity and other
adjustment burdens as "good economics"). But such a view ignores the "good eco-
nomics" of the Marshall Plan, whereby the world's major surplus country bore its
adjustment responsibilities by recycling part of its monetary surplus to deficit
countries. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7. at 163940 (discussing
the historical background and positive impact of the Marshall Plan on developing
countries). At other times, neoliberal discourse asserts that we "can't" even talk
about a progressive policy refor-such as forgiveness of Third World debt-
whether or not it is "good economics," because such proposals are not politically
feasible and such talk would undermine our own credibility. See Enrique Carrasco,
Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particularin': Intersections Between Lit-
Crit Theoty and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
313, 328 (1996-97) (arguing that opposition to neoliberal order would pose risk
2000] 289
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It is not enough to acknowledge that the two major neoliberal
policy reforms, capital account liberalization and asymmetrical bur-
dens of adjustment burdens, are important institutional foundations
of the new international economic order, that they serve the narrow
interests of particular private constituencies, or that they are based on
fatally flawed narrative justifications. We accepted the challenge of
asking whether this new order leads to greater peace, stability, fair-
ness and justice. 43 A review of global economic conditions and de-
velopments dictates a negative assessment. It is a painful and sad
material reality that the increased dependence of developing coun-
tries on short-term private capital inflows has all too often been fol-
lowed by sudden outflows of capital and financial and economic
collapse. 4
The pattern of addiction to inflow followed by sudden outflow has
been repeated so often that the phenomenon has been described as a
"contagion." Orthodox economists have perfected the strategy of
blaming each flare up of currency contagion on victim countries by
identifying exceptional factors (i.e., corruption, crony capitalism,
etc.) unrelated to the neoliberal agenda.45 Other terms such as the
"Asian flu" and the "Tequila effect" have also served to obfuscate
the role of neoliberal policy, while drawing attention to "excep-
tional" factors that are not all that exceptional.4 As periodic financial
scares and scandals have amply demonstrated, the United States is
guilty of many of the same so-called exceptional factors.
that "policymakers would not take our work seriously"). Such conclusions are un-
duly defeatist, as well as elitist by allowing neoliberal policymakers to assume the
role of gatekeepers of public discourse and political possibilities. See Canova,
Global Finance, supra note 37.
43. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (asking whether the new world
economic order will lead to greater peace, stability, fairness and justice).
44. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1585-86 (describing
how a country must protect itself against short-term money inflows).
45. See Ilene Grabel, Rejecting Exceptionalism: Reinterpreting the Asian Fi-
nancial Crises, in GLOBAL INSTABILITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 37-67 (J. Michie and J. Grieve Smith, eds. 1999). See
also Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1594 (describing how "blame
the victim" narratives subordinate perspectives critical of neoliberal model).
46. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1597-1600.
47. See id. at 1582-84, 1594 (reporting on American crony capitalism, conflicts
of interest, and lack of transparency); see also Timothy L. O'Brien and Raymond
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Moreover, the long list of currency crises Victims demonstrates
that there is nothing exceptional about addiction to neo-liberalized
hot money inflows.48 In the early 1990s, currency crises beset West-
em Europe as those countries liberalized capital flows between each
other and the outside world."9 Throughout the rest of the decade, the
world witnessed currencies suddenly collapsing from Mexico and
Latin America to East Asia, from Russia to the Horn of Africa. No
major area of the globe was safe from the threat or the reality of such
currency contagion. Neoliberal policy provided the common catalyst:
currency contagion humbled or threatened each country that had lib-
eralized its capital accounts and permitted inflows of short-term pri-
vate capital flows. 0
The new world economic order systematically adds insult to in-
jury. Many countries flattened by the global currency contagion have
been forced to accept the IMF's bitter medicine: a Structural Ad-
justment Program ("SAP") that usually includes a sharp currency de-
valuation, fiscal and monetary austerity, deep cuts in public subsidies
for food, fuel, and other basic necessities, sharply higher interest
rates, privatization of state-owned industries, deeper financial liber-
alization, and reform of central bank structure to free those bankers
from any accountability to wider electorates." The IMF has also
Bonner, Senior Bank Official Took Bribe, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000 at
A8 (reporting on alleged corruption of senior Bank of New York official (and
United States citizens) in illegally moving billions of dollars from Russia).
48. See Chantal Thomas, Balance of Payment Crises: Balancing Trade and Fi-
nance in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1249 (2000) (dis-
cussing trend in recent years for "sudden and sharp reduction of foreign investment
- most typically short-term portfolio investment" to trigger balance of payments
crises).
49. SIDEEK MOHAMED, EUROPEAN COMM UNITY LAW ON THE FREE MOVEMENT
OF CAPITAL AND THE EMU, 66-89 (1999) (reporting on European capital liberali-
zation); see WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC
OF GLOBAL CAPrrALIsM 227-229, 240-48 (1997) (arguing that although each crisis
involved its own peculiar errors and misapprehensions, all were "expressions of
the deeper disorders, but not its cause"); see also Timothy A. Canova, The Swedish
Model Betrayed, 37 CHALLENGE, May-June 1994, at 36-40 [hereinafter Canova,
The Swedish Model].
50. Canova, Currency Contagion, supra note 7, at 1597-1602.
51. See Canova, Global Finance, supra note 37 at 1556-1559. See also Jeffrey
D. Sachs, Calling the LM.F. to Account, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999 at A29 (de-
scribing how the IMF's lending policies have failed Russia).
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shown very little variation in the range of SAP policies that it de-
mands from victim countries as conditions for financial assistance."2
The IMF's structural adjustment approach has been a kind of
shock therapy, which effectively served to impose all of the burdens
of adjustment on the weakest and poorest people of the victim coun-
tries. Throughout Latin America, Asia, and other regions, it has been
common to see a wave of bankruptcies, sharply rising mass unem-
ployment, and dangerous declines in public health and safety stem-
ming from the IMF approach. 3 Such pain for the weak should also
be contrasted with the gains for the powerful. Capital flight to off-
shore bank havens54 and privatization of industries at bargain-
basement prices 5 further served to protect and enrich both the elite
within submerging countries and powerful financial interests in the
West. The severity of the IMF's structural adjustment programs led
to unprecedented criticism by the World Bank (the IMF's sister in-
stitution) and other critics both at home and abroad, which has fueled
52. Despite all of its "exceptionalism" arguments, the IMF has pushed a one-
size-fits-all approach to structural adjustment for deficit countries. See Joseph Sti-
glitz, The hIsider: What I learned at the world economic crisis, THIE NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2000 (presenting a scathing critique of IMF "cookie-cutter"
policy and policy-making processes).
53. See id. (reporting on frightening levels of depression in Asia and Latin
America and calamity in Russia); see also Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra
note 7, at 1643-44 n.305, 309 (reporting sharply rising levels of poverty, unem-
ployment, and underemployment); see also Larry Rohter, Brazil Collides With
LM.F. Over a Plan to Aid the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at A9 (discussing
the clash between Brazil and the IMF over the use of funds).
54. See Joseph Kahn, 15 Countries Named as Potential Money Laundering
Havens, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2000, at A4 (reporting that capital flight to "nonco-
operative" jurisdictions is disrupting financial markets). This suggests the need for
"cooperative capital controls." See LINDA MCQUAIG, THE CULT OF IMPOTENCE:
SELLING THE MYTH OF POWERLESSNESS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 223-24 (1998)
(noting that although John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the two ar-
chitects of Bretton Woods, agreed on need for cooperative capital controls, final
agreement failed to include such responsibility).
55. See ROBIN HAHNEL, PANIC RULES!: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 54-55, 58-59 (1999) (suggesting that through
capital flight and privatization, private capital takes on a predatory nature); see
also William Krehm, Lowering the Curtain on Transparency, 12 ECONOMIC
REFORM 1, 2 (Toronto, Feb. 2000); see also Stiglitz, supra note 52 (implicating
United States Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summer's association with Russian
oligarchs who exploited privatization).
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the anti-globalization movement.!"
For those countries, such as the advanced industrial economies,
that dodged the bullet of IMF structural adjustment, the mere threat
of currency contagion often leads to unilateral adoption of austerity
measures as a strategy to placate the foreign exchange markets. As
the world enters a new millennium, the central banks of those ad-
vanced economies may be entering a tug-of-war for scarce capital by
raising interest rates to attract hot money." Such rising and high lev-
els of real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates constitute a check on the
hopes of millions of people left behind by the new world order, at a
time when "hidden" unemployment remains at dangerously high lev-
els. 8
The IMF has been forced to acknowledge the widespread fear that
the overall benefits of the world economy are not reaching those in
developing countries.59 For less interested observers, and to many of
56. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1609 n.154 (reporting
criticism of World Bank and International Labor Organization); see also Jacques
Diouf, Global Trade Alone Will Not End World Hunger, IN'L HERALD TRIB., Feb.
18, 2000, at p. 8 (critiquing trade liberalization by director-general of the Food and
Agriculture Organization); see also IN DEFENSE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 18, 2000, at p. 20 (reporting United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development endorsing capital controls on short-term capital flows,
such as those that China successfully employed); see generally POOR COUNTRIES
DRAFT PROPOSAL ON POVERTY," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12. 2000 at A3 (reporting the
Group of 77 developing nations call on rich nations to forgive debt, share new
technologies, and shift decision-making from IMF to the United Nations); see gen-
erally John Kifier and David E. Sanger, Financial Leaders Meet As Protests Clog
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000 at Al (reporting on Mobilization for
Global Justice protests against IMF).
57. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (disucssing the current state of
scarce capital).
58. See How Higher Interest Rates Affect the Economy, 4 FOMC ALERT 5-7
(May 16, 2000) (stating that high real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates will even-
tually undermine economic growth, real wages, equitable distributions of wealth,
and social stability).
59. See Louis Uchitelle, Global Good Tines, Meet the Global Glut, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997 (reporting that globalization worsens the situation of mil-
lions by producing more goods "even as it suppresses wages at both ends of the
world"); see also Mark Weisbrot et al., Growth fay Be Good for the Poor-But are
IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth? (Center for Economic and Policy
Research, Washington, DC, 2000), reprinted at <http:' www.cepr.net> (criticizing
World Bank research report).
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the neoliberal policy victims, the verdict on capital account liberali-
zation and asymmetrical burdens of adjustment is even clearer. As a
result of these two pillars of the new international economic order,
there is less peace, less stability, less fairness and less justice around
the globe today. 60 It is only among the relatively few who have bene-
fited greatly by the new world economic order that we find greater
peace - those who are still at peace with themselves and at peace
with the declining levels of fairness and justice, while grasping at a
fleeting stability.
II. CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY AND
TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEOLIBERAL STATE
Central bank autonomy is a particularly sacrosanct foundation of
today's global economic order that undermines peace and stability."
Neoliberal discourse claims that central bank independence is both
good economics and necessary to ensure that monetary policy is pur-
sued in a socially and politically neutral fashion. In reality, central
bank autonomy is a euphemism for the capture of monetary policy
by interested private banking and financial interests"-it is a capture
intentionally designed by law. In addition, the undemocratic and se-
cretive nature of central banking is at odds with notions of "transpar-
60. The increased levels of social insecurity should be seen as major external-
ities that are not paid for by those who enjoy the lion's share of globalization's
benefit. See Canova, Global Finance, supra note 37 (amplifying the way the new
international monetary order undermines peace, stability, fairness, and justice).
61. See infra note 105-117 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
with today's global economic order).
62. See Bruce K. MacLaury, The Fed: Reconciling Autonomy and Democracy,
in THE ART OF MONETARY POLICY 75-84 (D. Colander & D. Daane, ed. 1994) (ar-
guing that a central bank needs separation from all political entities); see also An-
tonio Fazio, Role and Independence of Central Banks, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
CENTRAL BANKS 121-39 (P. Downes & R. Vaez-Zadeh, eds. 1991) (explaining the
importance of accountability for the actions of central banks).
63. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL
RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 392 (1987) [hereinafter GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE
TEMPLE] (describing Federal Reserve accountability to private financial constitu-
encies).
64. See Mark F. Bernstein, The Federal Open Market Committee and the
Sharing of Governmental Power With Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 1 II (1989)
(arguing that the Committee's present composition is constitutionally flawed); see
also GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE, supra note 63.
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ency," another one of the new world economic order's legitimating
justifications.65
Contrary to popular opinion in the United States, interest rates are
not set by the Board of Governors ("BOG") of the Federal Reserve
System (the "Fed"), but by the Federal Open Market Committee (the
"FOMC"), which includes the BOG as well as the presidents of
twelve privately-owned regional Federal Reserve Banks."' This ar-
rangement rests on very dubious legal foundations" and has survived
repeated constitutional challenges only because federal courts have
repeatedly refused to rule on the merits and have dismissed such
cases on narrow procedural grounds."'
65. The dominant discourse often attacks public sector economic activity as
lacking the efficiency and transparency of the private marketplace, except appar-
ently when such government activity takes the form of delegating monetary policy
to unaccountable and secretive central banks on behalf of private interests.
66. See generally THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS
4-13 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 8' ed., 1994) [hereinaf-
ter PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS] (establishing that while only five of the twelve re-
gional Federal Reserve Bank presidents vote on policy decisions, the other seven
presidents take part in FOMC policy discussions).
67. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the
Federal Reserve System was challenged as unconstitutional delegation and viola-
tion of appointments clause). The Federal Reserve System is also exempt from
many of the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Sunshine in Gov-
ernment Act, and Freedom of Information Act, and is the only federal agency that
entirely evades Congressional budgetary oversight. See Bernstein, supra note 64;
see also Howard J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitar
" 
Eecutive: Congressional
Delegations ofAdmninistrative Authorit' Outside the Federal Government, 85 N.W.
UNIV. L. REV. 62, 84-85 n. 66 (1990) (explaining how private groups exercise ad-
ministrative authority); see also Richard Stevenson, Study Criticizes Federal Re-
serve as Lax Manager, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996 at AI (reporting that the Gen-
eral Accounting Office concluded that the Fed had amassed slush fund of S3.7
billion for unexplained purposes).
68. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that the district court had equitable discretion to decline to hear the
case and that the doctrine of equitable discretion is not dependent upon the ability
of a plaintiff to bring suit); see also Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding
that the court lacks competence and the authority to decide such precise economic
questions); see also Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("We hold that Senator Riegle has standing to bring this action but exercise
our equitable discretion to dismiss the case on the ground that judicial action
would improperly interfere with the legislative process"); see also Reuss v. Balles,
584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 987 (1978) (upholding the
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Neoliberal discourse claims that the Federal Reserve's " independ-
ence from elected branches of government ensures that monetary
policy-making will remain apolitical. If the regional bank presidents
who sit on the FOMC are not accountable to Congress or the Presi-
dent, then to whom are they accountable? To which constituencies?
By law, they are accountable to the private commercial banks that
own the shares of each regional Federal Reserve Bank.70 It is there-
fore not surprising that as the Fed has gained more and more inde-
pendence from the elected branches of government, it has increas-
ingly followed policies that distinctly favor the interests of financial
capital over industrial capital and labor,7' namely, a strong bias in fa-
vor of price stability and near-zero inflation over the goals of full
employment and the financing of public sector programs."
The Federal Reserve's autonomy has long been the model for
central bank independence around the world - from the Bundesbank
in Germany to the IMF's demands for central bank independence as
a conditionality of its structural adjustment and financial assistance
programs. 3 But today's orthodoxy of central bank independence is
based on flawed narratives of history, such as the officially-
sanctioned story of Germany's inter-war hyperinflation which has
since been used to justify central bank independence everywhere,7"
district court's finding that appellant lacked standing to sue).
69. Hereinafter, the entire Federal Reserve System, including its Board of Gov-
ernors and Federal Open Market Committee, will be referred to as "the Fed" or
"Federal Reserve".
70. See Bernstein, supra note 64; see also PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra
note 66; see also Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market:
The Political Econon of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the
Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247, 249 (2000) (arguing that any
"deployment of power in society must be judged by the democratic accountability
which such force demands in any authentic... participatory democracy").
71. In the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March 195 1, the Federal Re-
serve System achieved independence from Treasury control without any legislative
action by Congress. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 13, 612 (1963).
72. Federal Reserve autonomy has also contributed to that agency's ratification
of marketplace evasions of regulatory controls. See infra note 73 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the autonomy of the Federal Reserve).
73. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1610-1615 (noting that
the autonomous central bank structure has served as a model around the world).
74. With the myths supporting the Bundesbank's independence, we see yet an-
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and particularly independence for the new European Central Bank."
The great myth supporting the Bundesbank's independence is born
from a truth (the colossal hyperinflation in Germany),"' but lives on
by ignoring context and historical fact to arrive at a flawed conclu-
sion: that government control of Germany's central bank led to the
Weimar republic's hyperinflation, which led directly to Hitler's rise
to power." Among other important historical facts that the dominant
other disturbing example of "the consequences of flawed history." See Gloria Va-
lencia Weber, American Indian Law and Histor: Instructional Mirrors, 44 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 251, 261 (1994).
75. During the hey-day of the Bretton Woods System. monetary policy was
vested in national central banks that were largely accountable to elected national
governments throughout Europe. The new European Central Bank is now unac-
countable to member states or to the European Parliament and European Commis-
sion. See Etienne De Lhoneux & Jean-Victor Louis, Towards a European System
of Central Banks, 5 J. INT'L. BANKING 8, 14 (1990); see also W. MAX CORDEN,
THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM, IN EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION AND ITS
MEANING FOR THE UNITED STATES 161 (1973). The governing Executive Council
of the European Central Bank consists of six board members (with eight year
terms) and the governors of the independent national central banks. See Christo-
pher A. Whytock, Eurofed: Toward a European System of Central Banks and a
European Central Bank, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 469, 472-76 (1992) (sug-
gesting that mere ratification of such central bank structures by national parlia-
ments somehow ensures future democratic accountability).
76. I was taught, like millions of American high school students, how German
workers had to run to the factory gates on payday to throw their earnings over the
fence to their waiting wives, who in turn had to run to the market to purchase
loaves of bread before the prices were raised again. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN,
THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 55, 495, 682-85
(1995) (reporting that "workers were paid and given time off several times during
the day to spend their wages before the money became worthless" because German
inflation exceeded 1 million percent in 1923).
77. See PAUL TSONGAS, THE ROAD FROM HERE: LIBERALISM AND REALITIES
IN THE 1980s 229 (1982) (relying on Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, FREE
TO CHOOSE (1980)). Tsongas, a former United States Senator and my former em-
ployer, wrongly argued that hyperinflation led to "the downfall of the Weimar Re-
public in Germany leading to Nazism." Id. See also Kohl Casts Europe's Eco-
nomic Union as War and Peace Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995 at AI0 (arguing
for tight fiscal controls because history shows hyperinflation led to the rise of Hit-
ler). More recently, former Chancellor Kohl defended his comparison of the inves-
tigations of his corrupt and illegal campaign fundraising to Nazi persecution of
Jews during the holocaust. He rejected calls that he resign from Parliament for
making such comparisons, saying that he "requires no history lessons." See Ger-
many: Kohl Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2000 at A5. See also Ralph Atkins,
Kohl investigated over secret parfunds, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30-31, 1999 at 1. But
at least with regards to his amnesia about the monetary and economic history
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narrative fails to tell is that the Weimar hyperinflation peaked in
1923 and was completely over by 1924.78 While the hyperinflation
did undermine faith in the Weimar Republic and in German democ-
racy, the hyperinflation was ended, not by the creation of an inde-
pendent central bank, but by the introduction of a new currency and
the Dawes plan, which granted Germany a temporary moratorium on
its World War I reparation payments. 9 Instead, it was a policy of de-
flation, based on tight money and wage austerity that created the
conditions of mass unemployment, which consequently led to Hit-
ler's rise to power. ° Nearly a decade after the hyperinflation ended,
fascism was thriving on the misery of soaring unemployment (as
high as forty percent) and extremely high real interest rates (which
8I
were masked by low inflation rates).
Perhaps more importantly, the dominant orthodoxy suggests that
Weimar hyperinflation resulted from politicians controlling the cen-
tral bank, then called the Reichsbank. This is a fairy tale that leads to
one conclusion: monetary policy is too important for public politics.
Politicians will give the people what they want, more money and
jobs, without sufficient concern for future consequences, i.e. hyperin-
leading to Hitler, Kohl apparently could use a history lesson.
78. Inflation peaked in 1923, the same year that Hitler was given a lenient sen-
tence for his Bavarian coup attempt-the so-called Munich putsch of October
1923. ADAM FERGUSON, WHEN MONEY DIES: THE NIGHTMARE OF THE WEIMAR
COLLAPSE 214 (1975). In between the lenient prison sentence and Hitler coming to
power a decade later, there was a global depression, severe price deflation, and
years of mass unemployment. See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 99 (1985).
79. See STEVEN B. WEBB, HYPERINFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN WEIMAR
GERMANY 124 (1989); see also BROADUS MITCHELL, DEPRESSION DECADE: FROM
NEW ERA THROUGH NEW DEAL 1929-1941 6 (1947) (reporting that the Dawes plan
of 1924, which included a loan of 800 million gold marks to help Germany meet
its reparations payment, ended the inflation in Germany).
80. See TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM, supra note 13 (describing how
the German policy of reducing wages ten percent contributed to high unemploy-
ment); see also LYNN TURGEON, STATE AND DISCRIMINATION: THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE COLD WAR 20 n.7, 115 (1989) (explaining that the Germans took a 10 % pay
cut and ended up with over 30% unemployment); see also TURGEON: ADVANCED
CAPITALIST SYSTEM, supra note 35.
81. See SIDNEY HOMER AND RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES
(1991) (enumerating, in their historical study of interest rates, that even with the
absence of inflation, the Reichsbank's discount rate rose to 15% in 1931, and the
open market discount rate rose to 10%).
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flation. A supposed overindulgence in democracy therefore justifies
central bank autonomy from democratic institutions. Thus, if we do
not want future hyperinflation and a future Hitler, then we should
take monetary policy out of the hands of the self-interested politi-
cians (who only understand immediate gratification) and hand it to
the stoic bankers and technocrats (who will look out for our long-
term interests).82
The problem with this narrative is that the Reichsbank was not ac-
countable to Weimar politicians during the period of hyperinflation.
Rather, it was already largely independent of German political con-
trol.83 Despite the so-called independence of the Reichsbank, Ger-
many suffered from the greatest hyperinflation in modem history,
largely because of the monetary expansion to pay war reparations
dictated by foreign interests." In fact, the hyperinflation was brought
to an end during a period in which the Reichbank's autonomy was
compromised by the declaration of a state of emergency."
82. The dominant narrative presents a particularly outrageous false dichotomy,
namely that hyperinflation is the only alternative to an autonomous central bank.
See Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, L. &
Social Inquiry 779, 820 (1993) (warning of false dichotomies).
83. In May 1922, at the behest of allied creditor nations, Germany made the
Reichsbank autonomous from government control. See STEVEN SOLOMON, THE
CONFIDENCE GAME: How UNELECTED CENTRAL BANKERS ARE GOVERNING THE
CHANGED WORLD ECONOMY 545 n.17 (1995) (reporting that the Reichsbank's
formal legal autonomy was undermined by its obligation to finance government
debt issues" to pay reparations burden). See also DAVID MARSH, THE MOST
POWERFUL BANK: INSIDE GERMANY'S BUNDESBANK 81-82 (1992).
84. The 1924 Dawes plan also required the appointment of foreign commis-
sioners for the Reichsbank. See Mitchell, supra note 79, at 8. With the Reichsbank
unaccountable to Weimar institutions, but instead to foreign creditors, it became an
easy target for Hitler. After his rise to power, Hitler made sure that the Reichsbank
was accountable to German institutions, albeit totalitarian ones. See CHARLES P.
KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939 177, 200, 239, 286 (1973)
(noting that Hitler dictated monetary policy by lowering interest rates to finance a
jobs program and economic recovery from the Depression); see also DAN P.
SILVERMAN, HITLER'S ECONOMY: NAZI WORK CREATION PROGRA\MS, 1933-1936
(1998). Since German reunification, rising mass unemployment-particularly in
eastern Germany-has coincided with a dramatic rise in Neo-Nazi activity and
violence. Roger Cohen, New Attacks Raise Fears About Anti-Semnitism in Ger-
many, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2000, at A4.
85. See Shirer, supra note 78, at 99 (stating that the Emergency Act placed all
executive powers in hands of Defense Minister and Army Commander-making
them "virtual dictators"--from Sept. 26, 1923 until Feb. 1924).
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The continuing dominance of such flawed historical narratives
serve to crowd out alternative narratives that are based on fact and
not myth. Proponents of central bank independence generally favor
"tight" monetary policies to keep inflation in check. They claim that
price stability is the best policy to ensure long-term economic
growth.8 6 Today it is considered heresy to endorse our alternative
history of America's great successes and accomplishments that were
made possible by political direction of the Federal Reserve. For more
than a decade, from 1941 to 1951, the executive branch directed the
Federal Reserve to purchase Treasury debt obligations in whatever
quantities and at whatever price necessary to keep short-term interest
rates pegged at 3/8ths of one percent and long-term rates at about
two percent. 7 As a result of this "pegged period" of monetary policy,
the United States Government was able to finance the military build-
up and mobilization that brought victory in Europe and Asia. When
World War II began, the country was still mired in the doldrums of
prolonged depression. By war's end, the United States gross national
product had more than doubled in only four years and the unem-
ployment rate had fallen from double-digits to less than two per-
cent."' After the war, the Fed's accommodation of the elected
branches helped to finance the G.I. Bill of Rights and the post-war
boom to the suburbs. 9 The revving up of the United States economic
engine during the 1940s remains truly unprecedented in world his-
tory, far surpassing the performance of the today's economy both in
terms of growth, and the wide distribution of its benefits. Yet,
throughout the entire "pegged period," there was no hyperinflation.
Rather, the elected branches of government did a better job of regu-
lating price stability than the central bank could have in such a high
86. See McQuaig, supra note 54, at 91 (suggesting that Milton Friedman pio-
neered such arguments).
87. See Canova, Free-Market Receivership, supra note 9, at 1300-01 (discuss-
ing the Fed's low interest rate policy during the "pegged" period).
88. See JOHN BLUM, ET. AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF TiIt
UNITED STATES SINCE 1865 683 (4th ed. 1977) (describing the economic effects of
WWII).
89. See Blum, supra note 88, at 721-22 (describing the conversion process
from a wartime economy to a peaceful one without propelling the nation into de-
pression).
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growth environment."
When critics of central bank independence bring up this hidden
history of the great accomplishments of the pegged period, they are
usually confronted with the argument that war-time justified this
transgression, this political manipulation of monetary policy. While
the orthodoxy is quick to raise the "War on Drugs" rhetoric to justify
incarceration of drug offenders, it refuses to tell the nation's central
bank-the single most important institution for economic good or
ill-that a war exists at all. This is at least the third war (recall the
"War on Poverty" and the "War on Crime") lost since the Federal
Reserve carved out greater autonomy from the elected branches. In-
stead of a mobilization of the nation's credit, central bank autonomy
means the privatization of the nation's financing, the neglect of a
large part of the potential labor force, and its mobilization into pris-
ons and jails-a virtual gulag that should shame the cheerleaders of
today's new economy.91
The Neoliberal State is destined to fail in providing peace and
prosperity for all92 precisely because central bank autonomy ensures
90. Wartime wage and price controls ensured price stability. Later, in the early
1960s, the Kennedy administration also managed to maintain price stability by
brokering a wage and price accord (an "incomes policy") between labor and man-
agement, and then enforcing it with the threat of antitrust prosecution for price
fixing by the steel companies who had violated the accord. See "LET THE WORD
Go FORTH": THE SPEECHES, STATEMENTS, AND WRITINGS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
1947-1963 156, 159-63 (Theodore C. Sorensen, ed. 1988) (providing Kennedy's
Apr. 11, 1962 speech entitled The Preservation of Price Stability). In contrast,
President Jimmy Carter rejected re-authorization of wage-price controls. See
ALEXANDER COCKBURN, THE GOLDEN AGE IS IN US: JOURNEYS AND
ENCOUNTERS, 264 (1995) (stating that Carter rejected the reauthorization, prefer-
ring instead to let the market take care of itself). Three years later, Carter may have
wished that he still had such emergency wage and price control authority, because
inflation contributed greatly to his reelection defeat in 1980. Id.
91. See Michael A. Fletcher, Criminal Justice Disparities Cited, WASH. POST,
May 4, 2000 at A2 (reporting that nearly 70 % of the 2 million Americans in pris-
ons or jails are black or Hispanic); see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE
162-70 (1999) (stating that a lack of proper funding to attack urban unemployment
has led to higher incarceration rates).
92. In the international human rights context, "failed states" have been defined
"as states which are incapable of protecting individuals within their territories," in
contrast to those states "that are unwilling though able, to provide such protection
or those which actively deny protection through affirmative violations of human
rights." Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protec-
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that monetary and economic policies will favor the few over the
many. The empirical evidence bears this out. Real interest rates re-
main at the highest sustained level of the century, 3 and this remains
one of the least recognized causes of today's top heavy distribution
of wealth and income94 both directly, by redistributing income from
debtors to creditors, and indirectly, by keeping down the real wage
rate in many industries, thereby reinforcing the hierarchies of power
that dominate the modem corporation. 95
The orthodoxy of central bank independence infects and dimin-
ishes our politics. In early 2000, President Clinton nominated Alan
Greenspan to a fourth term as Federal Reserve Chairman-nearly six
months earlier than necessary.96 The powers-that-be wanted to make
sure that neither Mr. Greenspan's nomination nor the Fed's monetary
policy would become an issue in election year politics. "7 Mr.
Greenspan basked in the glow of a booming bull market, proclaiming
that the nation was enjoying the greatest prosperity in world his-
tion fiom Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REv. 81, 84 n.6 (1999). It can be argued that the neoliberal state falls into the
category of "unwilling, though able" to provide its citizens with decent employ-
ment opportunities. The surrender of the Federal Reserve to private financial con-
stituencies can also be seen as sanctioning a certain kind of non-state economic
violence against the dispossessed and underemployed.
93. See Homer & Sylla, supra note 81, at 429-32 (describing real interest rates
in the United States between 1946 and 1990); see also JAMES MEDOFF AND
ANDREW HARLESS, THE INDEBTED SOCIETY: ANATOMY OF AN ONGOING
DISASTER, 68 (1996) (defining real interest rates).
94. See "HELLO, DOLLY!" (Ernest Lehman & Michael Stewart, 1969) ("Money
is like manure. Pile it in one place and it stinks; spread it around and it does a lot of
good").
95. See How Higher Interest Rates Affect the Economy, supra note 58; see also
STANLEY ARONOWITZ AND WILLIAM DIFAZIO, THE JOBLESS FUTURE: SCI-TECH
AND THE DOGMA OF WORK (1994) (discussing the effects of recent economic
trends on the United States workforce).
96. See Richard W. Stevenson, Greenspan Named to a Fourth Term as Ped
Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Stevenson, Greenspan
Named] (describing the positive reaction to Clinton's nomination of Greenspan to
an additional term of office); see also Richard W. Stevenson, Senate Ratifies
Nomination of Greenspan to 4 h Term, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at C2 [hereinafter
Stevenson, Senate Ratifies] (discussing Greenspan's confirmation to another term
as Fed chairman).
97. See Stevenson, Senate Ratifies, supra note 96 (discussing Clinton's re-
nomination of Greenspan as Fed Chairman).
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tory98-- altough soon after his coronation, the fear began to spread
through financial circles that it could be a prosperity built upon
sand.y
There is no doubt that the prosperity of which Mr. Greenspan
boasted has been a very top-heavy prosperity for the few. Most
Americans may feel better off by concentrating on rising stock prices
and their growing private wealth, but such prosperity is an illusion
based upon a wealth that can never be touched and could ultimately
prove temporary and fleeting. While distracted by living inside the
giant financial bubble-creating a kind of collective hypnosis and in-
fatuation with the big bull market-most Americans fail to notice
that they are much poorer in all things public.'O° The impressive, but
potentially ephemeral gains in private wealth should be contrasted
with our growing public squalor-with the losses to the com-
mons'01-resulting in part from the Fed's monetary stance which
constrains government financing for a host of social and economic
objectives.' 02 On a number of important social issues, governments at
98. Gerald Baker, Greenspan hails U.S. Economic System, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1999, at 3; Eileen Glauton, Mired Signals Puzzle Market; Greenspan Praises
High-Tech Economy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at 50.
99. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
100. See Noam Chomsky, Taking Control of Our Lives: Freedom, Sorereignty,
and Other Endangered Species, Keynote Address to the Interhemispheric Resource
Center's 20 Anniversary Celebration, (Feb. 26, 2000) 13-14 (transcript available
at <http://www.irconline.orglchomsky/index.html>) (arguing that public education
is based on the premise of caring about whether someone else's child is getting an
adequate education). Declining commitments to public education display a "turn-
ing away" from such cares. See id. (discussing corporate participation in American
education). See also Pink Floyd, On The Turning Away, on A MOMENTARY LAPSE
OF REASON (1987) ("Don't accept that what's happening /Is just a case of others'
suffering /Or you'll find that you're joining in /The turning away").
101. See Nicholas Timmins, U.S. Health System Ranks Just Ahead of Cuba, says
WHO, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 2000, at l(finding that the United States has the high-
est level of child poverty in the advanced industrial world, millions of Americans
are Without any health insurance and that the system as a whole ranks 54' in fair-
ness); see also JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED
DECLINE IN LEISURE, 1-15 (1991) (detailing the increase in work-time and decrease
in leisure time reported over the past two decades); Elizabeth Olson, America 's
Lead the World in Hours Worked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at C9; Stephen S.
Roach, Working Better or Just Harder?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2000, at A27 (ques-
tioning whether the U.S. productivity miracle may be a mirrage).
102. See BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA: INSIDE THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE
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all levels turn policy over to the private sector because of a supposed
lack of financial resources.' °3 Meanwhile, we are publicly poorer:
public health, public education, and public transport systems all suf-
fer in large part from the lack of long-term public investment. "'
The neoliberal state is one that dashes hopes and dreams on a mass
scale, and silently impoverishes the public sector, while delivering
great wealth to a small minority of global citizens. Yet even for those
enjoying the riches of the booming stock market, these are times of
fear and even paranoia about the future prospects of the high-tech
bubble. o5
91-92 (1994); see also James K. Galbraith, The Surrender of Economic Policv, 25
THE AM. PROSPECT 60, 64-67 (Mar.-Apr. 1996) (arguing that since conservative
economic policy currently prevails, liberals are left with few funds to spend on so-
cial programs). The Federal Reserve has become one of the most vocal mouth-
pieces of neoliberal "can't": the idea that the government can't do anything signifi-
cant to contribute to social progress, and that progress depends first, last, and
always on individual effort.
103. The privatization of prisons and the use of vouchers for private schools
provide two prominent examples of this trend. In the 1960 Presidential Debates,
John Kennedy called for the federal government to subsidize local teacher salaries.
See "LET THE WORD Go FORTH," THE SPEECHES, STATEMENTS, AND WRITINGS OF
JOHN F. KENNEDY, supra note 90, at 152 (calling for investment in human re-
sources through increased emphasis on education to provide economic opportunity
to the unemployed and depressed areas). Such federal subsidies could attract better
teachers, permit local schools to have smaller class sizes, and reduce the disparities
between local school districts. See also Bob Herbert, Room to Learn, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2000, at A23 (arguing that smaller class sizes are beneficial to students'
learning experiences); Jodi Wilgoren, National Study Examines Reasons Why Peo-
ple Excel, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at A14 (citing smaller class size and pre-
school access as important factors for educational achievement).
104. See Timmins, supra note 101 (describing the failing of the American health
care system); see also Herbert, supra note 103, (describing the poor state of
American public education). Compare Robert Pear, Clinton Asks Congress to
Raise the Limit on Visas for Skilled Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2000, at A16
(calling for more foreign skilled workers to fill job openings in high-technology
industries); with Jesse Jackson, Commencement Address to University of New
Mexico School of Law (May 13, 2000) (calling for federal funding to educate and
train Americans for high-tech jobs, rather than throwing them away into vast
prison system).
105. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Bursting the Intellectual Property Bubble,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2000, at A23 (finding the "internet bubble" threatened by
increased competition and dinning prospects of patent protection for internet tech-
nologies); see also Daniel Gross, Desperation of the Dot.Coms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2000, at A23 (describing the financial ups and downs of the newly developed
dot.com industries); see also Floyd Norris, Technology Stocks Join Steep Market
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In the days and weeks preceding this International Economic Law
Conference, computer hackers shut down a number of prominent
web sites through "denial of service" attacks, including those of
Amazon.com, Yahoo, CNN.com, E-Bay, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and H&R Block
during tax season."6 Federal investigators alternatively suspected
hackers from Seattle to Chiapas with an anti-WTO, anti-
globalization agenda to short-sellers seeking to profit on the decline
in internet stock prices (before finally having a fifteen year-old Ca-
nadian boy arrested).' 7 There was fear of such hackers, the so-called
"losers" from globalization, bringing down the entire Nasdaq high-
tech stock boom."8 It seemed, at times, that fear and insecurity
Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.12, 2000, at Cl [hereinafter Norris. Technology Stocks]
(reporting that technology stocks fell much the same way as other industry stocks);
see also Sabra Chartrand, Federal Agency Rethinks Internet Parents, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2000, at C12.
106. See Andrew Marshall and Charles Arthur, E- I'andals Make Coordinated
Attack on World's Top Websites, INDEP., Feb. 10, 2000, at I l(detailing the after-
math of the computer attacks on popular websites); see also Computer Vandals
Disrupted F.B.L Site, N.Y. TIMES, FEB. 26, 2000, at C4 (discussing the damages
done to the FBI's web site). In addition, Internet hecklers either breached a filter
system or hacked their way onto President Clinton's first live internet broadcast,
only one day ahead of a major White House conference on computer security. See
Clinton Gives Online Iterview and Hecklers Have a Field Dav, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 15, 2000, at A3 (at least two ribald remarks were posted un-
der Clinton's name and image in manner that suggested the words were Clinton's).
107. See Matt Richtel, Canada Arrests 15-Year-Old In Web Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000 (describing how one 15-year-old boy was suspected in com-
puter attacks that crippled some of the Internet's biggest web sites in February
2000); see also Barnaby J. Feder, Online Fingerpointing Finds Suspects Ever-
where," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at C6 (describing the chat room, electronic
bulletin boards and e-messing fingerpointing occurring after the web attacks); see
also Cybercrimie: Hearings Before the Subconum. on Commerce, Justice, State and
the Judiciary of the Senate Coni. on Appropriations, 1060 Cong. (2000) (state-
ment of Louis J. Freeh, Director FBI) (discussing cyber threats facing the United
States); see also Raymond Bonner, Web Attacks Have Government Revisiting
Laws and Security, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at C5 (reporting on the FBI's re-
sources used in the manhunt to arrest the cyber hacker); see also Matt Richtel &
Sara Robinson, Web Attacks Might Have Many Sources, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2000, at Cl (discussing the theory that groups, not an individual, were responsible
for the internet attacks); see also Seth Mydans. Computer I'andals Disrupted FBI
Site, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at B4 [hereinafter Mydans, Computer Vandals]
(reporting the release of a suspected hacker in Manila).
108. See Marshall and Arthur, supra note 106 at 11 (describing how some at-
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united winners and losers alike.'09 The alienated often might be poor,
but they might also be intelligent, capable of resistance, and pos-
sessing the "competitive skills necessary for future success."'' 0 If
their resistance were to bring about the failure of today's winners,
that would be quite a turnaround from the present reality."' And in-
deed, the cyber-vandalism of February 2000 coincided with some
tackers deliberately sought to induce economic hardships); see also Attacking E-
Commerce, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2000, at 24 (discussing the vulnerability of e-
commerce). Historians may some day conclude that the American high-tech stock
market craze was one of history's giant bubbles, on par with the Dutch tulip mania
and South Sea Bubble of centuries ago. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS,
PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 7, 38-42, 73-75, 92-94
(1989) [hereinafter KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES]; see also
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE, 271-73
(1984) [hereinafter KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY. Of course, prophets of
such doom are almost always ignored or attacked in their own time. See PAUL
TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 8 (1948) (concluding that prophets
of doom are often charged with pessimism and defeatism by majority of people).
109. See Vernon Loeb, Cyber Defenders, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 2000, at C3 (re-
porting Clinton's program to train cyber security guards); see also Matt Richtel,
Official's Testimony Hints at Slow Progress on Internet Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2000, at A16 (reporting that Clinton Administration requested additional $37
million to hire and train law enforcement to fight cybercrime). Now here's a po-
tential jobs program for alienated youth lost in cyber space.
110. See Mydans, Computer Vandals, supra note 107 (detailing the release of a
suspected computer hacker in Manila); see also Seth Mydans, Suspect Held In Vi-
rus Case is Free for Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2000, at CI (describing the Philip-
pine reaction to a local boy's ability to unleash a virus felt throughout the world);
see also John Markoff, A Newer, Lonelier Crowd Emerges in Internet Study, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at Al (reporting that internet creating broad new wave of
social isolation).
111. According to Professor Linda Longmire, the fear of alienated hackers
bringing an end to the high-tech bubble was reminiscent of the fall of the Roman
Empire and the suddenly futile boast that "all roads lead to Rome": when the hords
of Visigoths invaded and sacked Rome, they entered by those same roads that had
been constructed from its center in all directions to the far-reaches of the empire.
Likewise, in February 2000, investors worried whether a horde of hackers would
bring an end to their empires by entering on the cyberroads that had previously
promised prosperity. John Markoff, The Strength of the Internet Proves to Be Its
Weakness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Cl (observing that the open nature of the
internet makes it vulnerable to attacks); Mark Leibovich, Pranksters, or Barbari-
ans at the Gate?; Attack Leave Internet Denizens Wary, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
2000, at El (questioning the fate of e-commerce in the after math of the internet
attacks); The Key to Growth, Clinton Says, Is New Markets and the Internet, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 2000, at A14 (promising riches to follow from the internet high-
ways).
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sharp drops in the financial markets."2
Nearly every time the FOMC has met over the past year, begin-
ning in mid-1999, it has raised interest rates. To many market par-
ticipants and observers, this seemed like a dangerous time to raise
interest rates, even in incremental steps."' Widespread fears existed
because many stocks appeared tremendously overvalued"" and many
investors purchased stocks with borrowed money."' To raise interest
112. See Gross, supra note 105 (discussing the rise and falls of high-tech stock
prices); see also Norris, Technolog Stocks, supra note 105 (detailing the sharp
drop in high-tech stocks); see also Gretchen Morgenson, A Onetime Highlfying
Hedge Fund Appears Likely to Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000, at C I(re-
porting that losses at Tiger Management hedge fund will likely cause company's
closing); see also Danny Hakim, Huge Losses Move Soros to Revamp Empire,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at AI (reporting on losses at Tiger Management hedge
fund); see also Rhodes Fisburne, The Shadow in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TitEs, Apr.
29, 2000, at A13 (describing the fear felt by newly-formed high-tech companies);
see also David Leonhardt, Technology Share Plunge Hurting Stock Options, N.Y.
TIMES, at C1 (describing the effects on the stock prices of high-tech companies)
113. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed May Still Raise Rates When and If Stock
Slump Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at C 11; see also Timothy A. Canova, Can
Mr. Greenspan Tame the Big Bull?, ECON. REFORM 10-11 (Apr. 2000) (reporting
on enormous rise in margin debt-to highest percent of market value under current
rules, which date back twenty-five years).
114. See Gross, supra note 105, at A25 (arguing that high valuations of stock
prices of internet companies means that investors will demand that such companies
start making profits); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Analysts Talk and Ama-
zon.com Shares Reel, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2000, at Cl (discussing the fall of
Amazon.com's stock following the release of a report questioning the company's
financial health); see also Floyd Norris, Pahn's Saga: A Tale of Vanishing Profits
and Absurd Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2000, at Cl (describing the "transitory
success" experienced by one dot-coin company); see also Richard W. Stevenson,
Conference on the New Economy Gives Clinton a Chance to Glow, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2000, at A22 (reporting that much of the informal conversation at the con-
ference concerned the stock market). But see Frank Partony, Strange New Math of
Pahn, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A23.
115. See Gretchen Morgenson, Buying on Margin Becomes a Habit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2000, at C1 (reporting on worries of Arthur Levitt, chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, about high level of margin debt); see
also David Barboza, Swings in Markets Push Some Margin Buyers Out on a Limb,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at C1 (discussing several accounts of investors buying
on the margin); see also Margin Debt, 3 FOMC ALERT 13 (Dec. 21, 1999) (re-
porting that the first 11 months of 1999 witnessed a 46% increase of investors pur-
chasing stocks on the margin); see also The Big Board and Nasdaq Wave a Flag
on Margin Buying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2000, at C8 (reporting that chairmen of
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq issued unusual joint statement urging their
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rates in such a financial environment might seem a bit like lighting a
match"6 (if not a blow torch) in the middle of a gas station ." Since
the Federal Reserve operates largely in the dark (thanks to its
vaunted autonomy), the investing public, as well as so-called experts,
are often ill-informed and left playing a guessing-game."'" The lack
of transparency in the Federal Reserve's conduct of monetary policy
deprives the electorate of an opportunity to intelligently discuss and
debate important issues impacting private wealth holdings, the
course of the stock market, and the future value of the dollar.' " Or-
member brokerage firms to review amount of credit they extend to investors and to
consider voluntarily raising their margin requirements).
116. See Alex Berenson, Stock Prices Fall as Fears of More Interest Rate In-
creases Grow, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at CI (describing Wall Street's fear of
the effects of rising interest rates); see also Richard W. Stevenson, Greenspan
Treads Softly After Market's Gyrations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000, at C I (detailing
Greenspan's consistent increase in interest rates and the reaction by Wall Street);
see also Leonhardt, supra note 112 (explaining how the drop in stock prices cre-
ated an adverse effect on the value of stock options for corporate executives); see
also Floyd Norris, Founder Resigns Conseco Post, Under Pressure of Falling
Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at CI (discussing how the founders of one
company were forced to resign due to falling stock prices).
117. Each time the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates during the past year,
investors have turned bearish and the stock markets have dropped, sometimes sig-
nificantly. But after a short time, the markets usually come roaring back even
stronger. Frederick Lewis Allen described well the tension between policy and
mass psychology when he wrote that the Federal Reserve:
•.. waited patiently for the speculative fever to cure itself and it had only be-
come more violent. Things had now come to such a pass that if they raised the
rate still further, they not only ran the risk of bringing about a terrific smash
in the market - and of appearing to do so deliberately and wantonly.
Frederick Lewis Allen, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF TilE
NINETEEN-TWENTIES, 306 (1931). See also id. at 308 (concluding that "[t]he lesson
was plain: the public simply would not be shaken out of the market by anything
short of a major disaster."). Allen, of course, wrote about the 1929 Market Crash.
See also Robert Sobel, THE GREAT BULL MARKET: WALL STREET IN THE, 1920S,
49-76.
118. See Richard W. Stevenson, Pondering Greenspan's Next Move, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2000, at C I (questioning the forces driving Greenspan's consistent
raising of interest rates); see also Carl E. Walsh, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECON. LETTER, No. 2000-08 (Mar.
17, 2000) <http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/2000/el2000-08.html> (arguing
that lack of knowledge about policy forecasts may prove harmful to the economy).
119. See William Greider, Ducking For Cover, 4 FOMC ALERT 1-2 (Feb. 1-2,
2000) (noting that the closed nature of Federal Reserve policymaking favors dis-
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thodox discourse recognizes that there may be significant social costs
when foreign governments, other United States government agen-
cies, or private corporations fail to provide adequate and timely in-
formation to the investing public.'0 But the same orthodoxy turns a
blind eye to the costs of the Federal Reserve's power and secrecy,
and often those costs-such as to the quality of our public dis-
course-are hard to quantify, but no less important or real.'2
The present guessing game about the Federal Reserve's intentions
offers a wide range of theories. Supporters of the Federal Reserve's
creet exchanges with interested private financial traders). The closed, secretive,
and undemocratic nature of policy-making institutions is a common charactenstic
of the new international economic order. See Steven Greenhouse, Trade Ministers
Sidestep A Stick3, Issue: Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at A6 (reporting on
veil of secrecy surrounding the World Trade Organization and its ministerial
meeting in Seattle).
120. See Bhala, supra note 30 (contemplating mere publication of rules to sat-
isfy requirements of transparency); see also Floyd Norris, .Asleep at the Books: A
Fraud That Went On and On and On, June 16, 2000, at Cl (reporting on financial
losses stemming from lack of transparency of accounting practices).
The IMF considers transparency for central banking to be satisfied by publishing
the bank's goals and policy instruments and practicing "'good governance," which
"calls for central banks and financial agencies to be accountable, particularly
where the monetary and financial authorities are granted a high degree of auton-
omy." See IMF, Code of Good Practices on Transparenc in Monetar
"
y and Finan-
cial Policies, (Sept. 26, 1999) (reprinted at <http://wNlxv.imf.org/externat/np'mae,
mft/index.htm>). [hereinafter IMF, Code] (providing an overview of the IMF's
Code for sound financial policies). Of course, the IMF regularly pushes autonomy
for central banks. By accountability, the IMF foresees that central bankers should
be available to report on monetary policy and comply with ethical accounting and
financial standards, not a very high standard of transparency in the formulation of
policy by boards that lack diversity and meet in private. See IMF Code (finding
that monetary and financial policies can be more effective if not made in private
and central banks and financial agencies should be made accountable).
121. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Reconsiders Polic
" 
of Disclosing Tilt on
Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at C7 [hereinafter Stevenson, Fed Reconsiders]
(reporting that Fed considering earlier disclosure of policy).
122. See Canova, Global Finance, supra note 37, at 1578 n.128 (noting that for
all of its sophistication, the present generation has little understanding of financial
and economic matters); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in
a Bubble Economy, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1053, 1069-76 (1996) (second-guessing
Bank of Japan's handling of Japan's bubble economy without questioning the
premise of central bank secrecy); cf Michael Hutchinson, Japan 's Recession: Is
the Liquidit, Trap Back?, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCisco EcON.
LETrER, No. 2000-19 (June 16,2000).
2000] 1309
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
interest rate increases seem to accept, at face value, Mr. Greenspan's
most widely reported justifications of a pre-emptive strike against
any future inflation in consumer prices.'23 Some of his critics won-
dered if the Fed was not actually more concerned with asset price in-
flation and trying to prick the stock market bubble before it got any
larger. 24 Other critics wondered if the Fed was not trying to influence
the 2000 Presidential election by engineering an economic slowdown
that would damage Vice President Al Gore's election prospects.''
The Federal Reserve's lack of transparency serves to obscure the
way that today's neoliberal monetary order undermines the long-term
prospects of the United States economy. For instance, Mr. Greenspan
had spoken repeatedly about the dangers of the so-called "wealth ef-
fect" stemming from the rise in stock prices.'26 As reported by the
123. See Richard W. Stevenson, Greenspan Warns of Another Rise in Interest
Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at Cl [hereinafter Stevenson, Greenspan
Warns] (detailing Greenspan's testimony before the House Banking Committee in
which he hinted that the Fed would continue to raise interest to avert an inflation
buildup); see also Robert T. Parry, Why Has the Fed Been Raising Interest Rates?,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCo ECON. LETTER, No. 2000-17 (May 26,
2000) <http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/2000/el2000-l7.html> (agreeing
with Greenspan's decision to gradually increase interest rates since last summer).
124. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Isn't Aiming at Markets, Greenspan SaVs
in a Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Stevenson, Fed Isn't
Aiming at Markets] (reporting on Greenspan letter to Representative Jim Leach,
chairman of House Banking Committee); see also Bill Barnhart, Stock Trading
Process Under Fire; Greenspan Warns of the Hidden Costs, CHI. TRIB. Apr. 14,
2000, at N5 (reporting that Senator Jim Bunning sternly questioned whether Fed-
eral Reserve Board was exceeding its authority by trying to "jawbone" stock prices
lower); see also Lawrence Kudlow, Greenspan, Through the Looking Glass, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A21 (questioning whether the Fed's interest rate policy is
not doing more harm than good); see also Jacob M. Schlesinger and Glenn
Burkins, Greenspan Clarifies View on Stock Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2000, at
A2 (discussing recent speculation that Fed was moving interest rates to adjust
stock prices).
125. See James Galbraith, Putting in the Fix?, 4 FOMC ALERT 1-7 (Mar. 21,
2000) (arguing that the Federal Reserve's decision to raise interest rates may serve
as an implicit backdrop during the 2000 presidential election).
126. See Stevenson, Fed Reconsiders, supra note 121 (describing Greenspan's
testimony before the House Banking Committee); see also Richard W. Stevenson,
Tracking the Wealth Effect; Imbalance of Supply To Demand Causes Greenspan to
Fret, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at Cl [hereinafter Stevenson, Tracking the
Wealth Effect] (describing Greenspan's testimony before the Senate Banking
Committee).
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mainstream financial press, this wealth effect threatens to ignite
United States consumer price inflation.'27 It is rare to see any mention
that the wealth effect also contributes to the consumer spending that
is fueling the sharply rising American trade and current account defi-
cits, and the resulting dangers to the dollar.'2' Americans import
much more than they export-and at all-time record levels'- -for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which is that every currency other
than the dollar took a sustained speculative beating over the past
decade.3 Frightened foreign capital-neoliberalized capital-fled to
the United States, pumping up the value of the dollar, as well as our
stock and bond markets. In addition, the surging dollar has kept in-
flation low by flooding our shores with cheap imports."'
But as Mr. Greenspan knows all too well, the trade and current ac-
count deficits-this "imbalance"--is precisely what is "not sustain-
able" and the gaping United States payments deficit can only be fi-
nanced by "ever-larger portfolio and direct foreign investments in the
127. See Stevenson, Tracking the Wfealth Effect, supra note 126 (describing how
the "wealth effect" may lead to an outbreak of inflation).
128. See Alan Beattie, Warning of global hard landing, FIN. TIMES, June 6,
2000, at I (warning that the United States dollar and stock markets could drop
sharply in tandem); see also Richard W. Stevenson, Econon
" 
Alar Have a Sofi
Spot, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2000, at BI (reporting that the swelling United States
trade deficit worries some experts and policymakers); see also Jane D'Arista, ..Is-
sessing the U.S. Capital Account, CAP. FLOWS MONITOR, (Financial Markets Cen-
ter, Philomont. Va., Dec. 6, 1999); see also William Greider, Shopping Till We
Drop, THE NATION, Apr. 10, 2000, at 11-15 [hereinafter Greider. Shopping Till We
Drop] (reporting that "cumulative net [United States] obligations to foreign credi-
tors reached an astonishing 18 percent of [gross domestic product] by the end of
1998, and by now may be 20 percent or higher"); see also Richard W. Stevenson,
Clinton Views Economy With Careful Pride and Caln Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 2000, at Cl, C6 [hereinafter Stevenson, Clinton liiews Econonn'] (reporting on
President Clinton's concern about the growing U.S. trade deficit).
129. See Growth in Industrial Sector Was Less Robust in February, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2000, C30 (stating that the record United States merchandise trade deficit
surpassed $338 billion for 1999, a 53 percent increase from S220 billion for 1998).
130. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
131. The United States helped stave off disaster in Asia by acting as the "'im-
porter of last resort." See Gerard Baker, Where the buck stops, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2000, at 20 (arguing that only structural reform will ease the overvalued dollar);
see also Christopher Swann, Dollar resists stock market rolatilin', FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2000, at 39.
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United States, an outcome that cannot continue without limit.""'
Traditionally foreign exchange traders start selling a currency short
when a country's current account deficit reaches five percent of its
gross domestic product (GDP). '33 By April 2000, the United States
trade deficit rose to $389 billion and the current account deficit to
$367 billion over the previous twelve months.' The current account
deficit of the United States was over four percent of GDP and grow-
ing larger."'
Mr. Greenspan also knows that the only way to entice foreign
money in order to finance our deficit is to maintain the dollar at a
clearly overvalued level.'3 6 Not surprisingly, the Fed first started
raising interest rates last June, the same time that the Bank of Japan
began to intervene in foreign exchange markets in order to slow the
rise of the yen. 11 This is the dilemma that many other deficit coun-
132. See Chairman Alan Greenspan, The Revolution In Information Technol-
ogy, Remarks Before the Boston College Conference on the New Economy (Mar.
6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/BoardDocs/Speeches/ 2000/
2000306.htm>. See also STEPHEN MARRIS, DEFICITS AND THE DOLLAR: THE
WORLD ECONOMY AT RISK 85-88 (1987 ed.) (providing early warning of huge
capital inflow needed to sustain value of dollar).
133. Scott E. Pardee, Speculator hunt begins at home, J. OF COMMERCE, Jan. 10,
1997, at 9A. See Denise Caruso, How Traders In Futures Decide to Buy Or Not to
Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at A17, A19 (fund managers exhibit herd men-
tality on when to buy or sell by relying on same computerized predictive models).
134. See Financial Indicators: Trade, Exchange Rates and Budgets, TtI 
ECONOMIST, June 24, 2000, at 121 (illustrating trade deficit and current account
deficit figures).
135. See To Boldly Go .... THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 29, 30 (finding
that the rising trade deficit and increasing debt-service payments to foreigners, the
United State's current-account deficit, which is now over 4% of GDP, will grow
even larger).
136. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, In the Seesaw of Currencies, the Dollar Stands
Tall in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at CI (explaining that the dollar is
strong against the Euro and weak against the Yen).
137. See Market Intervention by Japan Sends Yen Down vs. Dollar, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2000, at C19. Unlike the United States and Europe, Japan was trying to de-
press its currency to improve its export position - a sign of the weak Japanese
economy. See Paul Krugman, The Japan Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at
A29; see also U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (Sept. 3, 1999) (report-
ing that the Bank of Japan intervened in currency markets to prevent the apprecia-
tion of the yen); Rebecca Bream, AfDB returns to yen market, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2000, at 28 (stating that African Development Bank issued a 50 billion yen, 10-
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tries have had to face over the past decade: in a world of free flows
of private portfolio capital, the overvalued dollar can be maintained
vis a vis other major currencies only by raising interest rates.'
There now appears to be a global tug-of-war for hot money be-
tween the major financial powers of the advanced capitalist system.'
In the first ten months of 1999, the Euro-zone experienced a current
account surplus of approximately $38 billion, but much larger net
outflows of direct investment (about $99 billion) and portfolio in-
vestment (about $51 billion).'" As a consequence of this speculative
outflow away from the Euro, the European Central Bank was repeat-
edly forced to bid up its interest rate, often in response to similar in-
terest rate increases by the Federal Reserve. ''
Similarly, when American stock markets experienced frightening
drops in prices, fear and panic selling have often spread quickly
around the globe. 42 Yet, on occasion that was good news for the
year note, "reflecting the rising popularity of yen-denominated bond deals").
138. See Europe's Central Bank Raises Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2000, at C4 (reporting an increase in interest rates from 3.25 to 3.5%); see also
Keith Bradsher, Dollar's Four-Day Plunge Halts; Greenspan Hints at Higher
Rates: Action Could Prop Up Currency but Cause Econoin to Slow, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1995, at Al, D8 (reporting as early as 1995 that Greenspan might raise in-
terest rates to encourage investors to purchase dollar).
139. See Edmund L. Andrews, Europe 's Central Bank Acts to Raise Inlation
Barrier: Half-Point Rise in Rates Aids Euro, Britfly, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9, 2000, at
C4 [hereinafter Andrews, Europe's Central Bank] (reporting that the European
Central Bank raised interest rates to help insulate Europe against inflation). See
also Floyd Norris, Through The Looking Glass: Europe Raises Interest Rates,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at Cl; Edmund L. Andrews, The Metamorphosis of
Germany Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, §3, at I (reporting that total market
capitalization of German's New Market technology sector has skyrocketed); Ter-
zah Ewing, Foreign IPOs Are Seducing U.S. Investors With Their Allure of Un-
tapped Potential, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at C13 (reporting that IPO's from
foreign companies are an attractive category for investors).
140. See Thepu.zle ofEuro weakness, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29. 2000, at 14.
141. See Andrews, Europe's Central Bank, supra note 139 at C4; see also Ed-
mund L. Andrews, Rate Increase Fails to Halt Euro's Slide Against Dollar, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at Cl; Norris, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 139.
To the extent that the European Central Bank lags behind the Federal Reserve in
raising interest rates, the American dollar could soar, along with the United States
trade and current account deficits. To the extent that the Federal Reserve lags be-
hind, the dollar could fall, threatening American financial markets.
142. See Michael Morgan, et al., Wall Street sharply down on rate fears, FIN.
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United States stock market as European and Asian losses meant that
hot money was once again seeking refuge in the strong dollar.' For
instance, on April 25, 2000, after one of the worst months in stock
market history, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose about two
percent and the Nasdaq index rose 6.6 percent, all in one day.'
While the news report in the New York Times called it a "curiously
excellent day" for most United States stock market indexes, "' any
reader could look at the bottom of the same page for clues: the Euro-
pean currency - the Euro - plunged more than two percent on the
same day.'4 6 With each round of such financial turmoil, as with each
round of interest rate increases, the dollar became stronger and more
dangerously overvalued.
4 7
It seems clear that the Federal Reserve has had little choice but to
raise interest rates in the middle of an overvalued stock market and
an overvalued currency. 4 Few want to speak it, but today's "Lin-
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at 1; see also Christopher Swann, Dollar revival puts yen oi
defensive, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at 29.
143. See Mark Landler, Asian Technology Stocks Fall, Echoing Nasdaq Dive,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000, at C12; see also Craig S. Smith, Sporting a Wall Street
Hangover, Asian Markets Fall Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, at C 18.
144. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Broad Rally Lifts Nasdaq to 6.6% Gain, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at CI.
145. See id.
146. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Gains in European Stocks Being Swept A wv'av by
the Sinking Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at CI (reporting the plunging of the
Euro). Those United States stock market gains may also have been at the expense
of recent steep Japanese stock market losses. A weak earlier, Nasdaq had an iden-
tical 6.6% gain in one day while Asian markets were slumping. See Gretchen Mor-
genson, Nasdaq Clocks 6.6% Advance, But the Result Proves Mixed, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2000, at C1; see also Smith, Sporting A Wall Street Hangover, supra note
143; Stocks Off Nearly 4% in Tokyo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2000, at B2.
147. The "hot money" inflows prop up the overvalued dollar, which in turn fuels
a rising U.S. payments deficit, necessitates future inflows of foreign capital, and
keeps the dollar rising. Such a cycle is far from "virtuous"; it merely postpones the
inevitable "correction" in the dollar, because it's the only type of adjustment that
the deregulated global financial system permits. Compare Gerard Baker, Inflation
live, warns Greenspan, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1998, at 3 (discussing Greenspan's
argument that a strong United States economy is product of a "continuing 'virtuous
cycle' of high-productivity, low-inflationary growth which has bolstered confi-
dence in securities markets, which in turn improves consumer and business confi-
dence and leads to higher investment and consumption").
148. Despite its concerns with the wealth effect from a rising stock market, the
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precedented prosperity" could turn into a future currency contagion
that pulls down the dollar, and along with it, American financial
markets and the economy itself.'49 When a country comes to rely al-
most exclusively on private short-term portfolio investment in highly
liquid securities, then its prosperity is sure to be both top-heavy and
unsustainable. That is the price our generation may suffer for forget-
ting that long-term economic development and social progress de-
pends largely upon our commitment of long-term public capital in-
vestment to the future.
This is the legacy of the complete lack of genuine accountability
among leading central banks: high real interest rates, stagnant real
wages for most, a top-heavy distribution of wealth and income, se-
vere constraints on public sector investment that only intensifies the
reliance on a speculative, financial bubble. As fear stalks both the la-
bor and stock markets, there is a willing blindness and a deafening
silence in our politics about such money matters.
III. WE HAVE OTHER ALTERNATIVES"
The new world economic order has created a world that is less
peaceful, less stable, and less just than what we are capable of hav-
ing. Yet the proponents of this new order claim that there is no alter-
native, and that if we want the benefits of globalization, we are stuck
Federal Reserve refuses to raise margin requirements. See Stevenson, Fed Isn't
Aiming At Markets, supra note 124. Is this because higher margin rates would
cause serious financial disruptions to large investors? See also Gretchen Morgen-
son, Stock-Trading Cheerleader Now Faces $45 Million Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
19, 2000, at Al (reporting on losses stemming from margin calls). Or because
higher margin requirements, like higher wealth taxes, could drive "hot money"
away to foreign markets? See Timothy A. Canova, Can Mr. Greenspan Tame the
Big Bull?, ECO. REFORM 10-11 (Apr. 2000) (citing Will Lyons, Greenspan's
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, A28 (calling for higher wealth taxes to siphon
off the wealth effect)). Once again, the lack of significant oversight permits the
Federal Reserve to dismiss alternatives as ineffective.
149. See Floyd Norris, When Will Stocks Really Crumble? After the Dollar
Does, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at C 1; see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRI.%TH, THE
GREAT CRASH, 1929 (1961), at xxi ("It is evident that the capacity of the financial
community for ignoring evidence of accumulating trouble, even of wishing de-
voutly that it might go unmentioned, is as great as ever").
150. See Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobiliy, supra note
20, at 228 n.43 (contesting artificial limits on reform); see also id. at 203 n. 52
(detailing other possible alternatives for reform).
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with some of the costs. They promise that the costs are only short-
term and that globalization will lead to increased living standards in
the long-run.' The only alternative, they claim, is protectionism and
declining living standards. But this is a fool's choice. There are other
paths that would permit the benefits of globalization (increased trade,
travel, communications), while throwing out the worst aspects of the
neoliberal model, including unrestricted and speculative "hot money"
capital flows, asymmetrical adjustment burdens, and central bank ir-
responsibility.
Likewise, the cheerleaders of today's neoliberal order offer an-
other false dichotomy: that the only alternative to keeping the IMF
essentially unchanged (with its agenda of free hot money capital
flows, asymmetrical burdens of adjustment, and central bank irre-
sponsibility) is to scrap the IMF completely. Once again, this allows
even regressive reform to appear as progressive." 2 Until the political
vision and will is found for genuinely progressive reform of the new
international order, we must call for strengthening the policy tools
that already exist."3
For instance, countries must be permitted to use their powers (un-
der Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement) to control short-
term capital flows. Such restrictions on hot money can take many
forms, from outright controls (such as in Malaysia) to tax incentives
that favor long-term over short-term investments (such as the "speed-
bumps" that worked effectively for a time in Chile), to a possible
turnover tax on foreign exchange transactions (the so-called Tobin
151. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, MONETARY REFORM 88 (1924) ("in the long
run we are all dead"). For those suffering from the injustices and failures of the
neoliberal policy, the long run can not arrive too soon.
152. See Joseph Kahn, Treasury Secretary Offers A New Vision for the LM. F.
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at C4 (reporting on Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summer's proposal to require IMF to phase out low-interest-rate financing and to
force deficit countries to raise money from private sources at prevailing (i.e.,
higher) interest rates); see also Joseph Kahn, Treasury Secretary Wants New Stress
on Latin Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at C4 (stating that the Secretary of
Commerce advocates changes in how international aid agencies combat poverty in
Latin America).
153. See Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 17, 27 (1997) (arguing that we must assume the responsibility for preserving
"the strength and good that is in our indigenous thought and refuse to blindly mir-
ror the Anglo-American model").
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Tax proposal)." Such authority for capital controls should be
strengthened to require affirmative obligations on nations to track
down and return capital that fled in violation of lawful restrictions.'
Such "cooperative capital controls" would require the development
of a closed-circuit international payments system, which uses com-
puter technology to enforce the new rules of the game.""'
As nations reduce their reliance on short-term private capital
flows, there must be a revival in official public capital transfers-
such as the recycling of surpluses that were so successful during the
Marshall Plan.' 7 We should not wait until there is another dire for-
eign or domestic threat to adopt such measures. We must reclaim our
history by remembering that such transfers of public capital and re-
cycling of surpluses are also good for the giver." Some of the tools
to accomplish those ends already exist. The "scarce currency clause"
(Article VII of the IMIF Articles of Agreement)"" along with Article
12 of the World Trade Organization charter'" should be used aggres-
154. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1622-33 (discussing
restrictions on short term capital inflows).
155. See id. at 1622-33 (discussing need for cooperative capital controls); see
also Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications Jbr International
Economic Law, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1425 (2000) (calling for cooperative ef-
forts to retrieve money stolen by corrupt leaders).
156. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1631 n.251 (citing Ste-
phen Zamora, Remarks, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 188, 201-04 (1992)).
157. A common type of financial assistance in today's monetary order consists
of IMF loans to support a central bank's foreign reserves. But such assistance can
easily disappear in capital flight to offshore banking havens. In contrast, Marshall
Plan-type lending can be tied to tangible projects that produce real public goods
and infrastructure, including human capital. See David W. Jones and Christine
Dolan, Kenyan president envisions a "Marshall Plan .for ,Alfrica, WASH. TIMEs,
Feb. 20, 2000, at CI (reporting that the Kenyan president welcomed a leading role
for the United States to help improve life for the African people). See also ROBERT
B. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 235-82 (1983) (recognizing the need
for public investment in human capital).
158. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1638-41 (comparing
Marshall Plan's benefits to the United States economy with failure of Japanese
economy by failing to recycle its surpluses).
159. See id. at 1642-43 (discussing the Scarce Currency Clause).
160. See Thomas, supra note 48 (advocating use of \\7O Art. 12 to encourage
surplus countries to open their markets to deficit countries); see also Greider,
Shopping Till You Drop, supra note 128.
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sively to encourage surplus countries to open their markets to deficit
countries and to recycle their surpluses through outright grants. As
the leading deficit country, the United States has a strong interest in
shifting the burdens of adjustment from deficit to surplus countries,
sooner rather than later, before we feel the currency contagion and
the awful discipline of a crashing dollar.
By shifting the burdens of adjustment to surplus countries, we rec-
ognize that successful countries have an obligation to share their suc-
cess with those left behind. Such a change could be monumental- it
could permit a race-to-the-top, because higher labor, environmental,
and human rights standards would no longer present the same threats
to the competitiveness of reforming countries.' 6' The grand bargain
should be that labor, human rights, and green standards be explicitly
recognized in the World Trade Organization, ' in return for a com-
plete reform of the adjustment burdens from deficit to surplus coun-
tries and sizable increases in aid from rich to poor countries. Such an
arrangement should start with the forgiveness of debts of the poorest
countries' 63 and the strengthening of the IMF by authorizing it to is-
sue more global liquidity in the form of additional Special Drawing
Rights.'64
161. See Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Flows, supra note 20,
at 230 n.51 (discussing the threats upon reforming countries and the WTO Seattle
meetings in which American labor unions urged the Clinton administration to im-
pose trade sanctions on nations violating labor rights). See also infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
162. See Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theor'
and Treaty Intetpretation, 31 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1999) (advocat-
ing that a link between human rights and trade provisions be recognized by the
WTO). See also Bunn, supra note 155 (arguing that United Nations declarations
and covenants provide for right to development that includes right to work and to
standard of living adequate for health and well-being of each person and his or her
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services); see also Intemational Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing in articles 6 and 7 the
right of everyone to work and to fair wages, and in articles 11-13 the right of eve-
ryone to adequate standard of living, health, and education).
163. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1636 n.274 (explaining
that debt relief could relieve some of the burden of adjustment from deficit coun-
tries); see also Bunn, supra note 155.
164. See Canova, Neoliberal Contagion, supra note 7, at 1633-36 (discussing
the possibility of increasing global liquidity with special drawing rights).
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Some orthodox voices will argue that these alternatives are not
politically feasible, even while conceding that reforms are necessary
for a more peaceful, stable and just world. Ultimately we are con-
fronted not with an economic or scientific problem, but rather, a
challenge to reform a political system that institutionalizes a silenc-
ing of our public discourse. While the mass media becomes more
concentrated in fewer corporate hands, 6 5 and as debate is limited to a
choice between two political parties that share complicity in main-
tamining a closed society,' 66 other avenues of resistance and reform are
opening.
The "Spirit of Seattle" shows that important activity and discourse
is taking place, through the internet and one-on-one exchanges, to
build a civil and open society in which more global citizens will
learn to speak a new language about the way globalization impacts
our lives.' 67 It points the way to a new politics in which new possi-
bilities will open. We must cast aside our fears that articulating a
genuine progressive reform agenda will fall on deaf ears. We must
make the case, and we must replace today's neoliberal can't with a
progressive "can do" vocabulary that unites today's excluded con-
stituencies.
165. Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach to Structural Regula-
tion of the Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 614 (2000) (warning
that demise of low power radio access would "retard the goal of providing an al-
ternative to increasingly consolidated commercial broadcasting"); Lili Levi, Ra-
tionales & Realizations: Regulating the Electronic Media, 38 JURIMETRICS 515,
544 (1998) (suggesting need for alternatives to "concentrated private decision-
making in the media").
166. See Stephen Labaton, House Clears Bill to Curb Plans for FM, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2000, at C1 (reporting that the House of Representatives, while prodded
by the nation's largest broadcasters, approved legislation that would curtail ambi-
tious plans to open FM radio airwaves to hundreds of new low-power stations for
schools, churches and community groups).
167. Soros, supra note 2.
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